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Five Unanswered Questions from
Trump v. Hawaii
Josh Blackman *
Trump v. Hawaii upheld President Trump’s travel ban in
its entirety. This article explores five questions left open by the
majority opinion. First, what will happen on remand with
respect to discovery? Second, how should lower courts treat
“this President,” as opposed to “the President”? Third, how
does the Constitution apply to aliens who are not seeking entry
into the United States but have already crossed the border?
Fourth, what is the scope of the president’s Article II power to
exclude aliens? Lastly, what is the permissible scope of a
nationwide injunction? The judiciary will likely have to address
these issues in the near future.
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Introduction
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld the third
iteration of President Trump’s travel ban in its entirety. 1 This
outcome should not have been much of a surprise. In December, a
majority of the Supreme Court allowed the entirety of that policy to
go into effect temporarily. 2 Over the past decade, when the Roberts
*

Associate Professor, South Texas College of Law Houston. This essay
builds on and incorporates prior writings that were published on the
Lawfare Blog, SCOTUSBlog, and other outlets.

1.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).

2.

Josh Blackman, The Supreme Court Tips its Hand on Travel Ban 3.0,
(Dec.
4,
2017,
10:30
PM),
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-tips-its-hand-travel-ban-30
[https://perma.cc/UE4K-E5N4].
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Court has stayed a lower court’s ruling, it has almost always reversed
its judgment. 3 This case was no exception. Furthermore, the court
resolved the legality of the presidential proclamation in its entirety.4
The justices did not settle on some sort of Solomonic split. For
example, the government could deny entry to aliens with nonimmigrant visas but must admit aliens with immigrant visas.
President Trump prevailed on all claims. The majority opinion,
however, leaves open at least five unanswered questions that the
judiciary will likely have to address in the near future. This essay will
discuss those questions.

I.

What happens on remand with respect to
discovery?

The government appealed Trump v. Hawaii to the Supreme Court
after preliminary injunctions were issued by district courts in Hawaii
and Maryland. 5 The Hawaii decision concluded only that the plaintiffs
were unlikely to succeed on the merits at this preliminary phase.6 It
was not, and could not have been, a final judgment on the merits.
The penultimate sentence of the chief justice’s opinion explains that
“[t]he judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” 7
On remand, therefore, the plaintiffs are within their rights to seek
a summary judgment, and even a trial, about whether the
proclamation is unlawful. It is unlikely that additional proceedings
would alter the Court’s statutory analysis, which involved pure
questions of law. 8 However, further proceedings could shed light on
the “animus” 9 question with respect to the Establishment Clause.
Noah Feldman, relaying comments from his colleague Owen
Fiss, points out that “the standard of proof of bias that the plaintiffs
would have to meet could actually be lower at trial than in their
3.

Josh Blackman, Understanding the Supreme Court’s Equitable Ruling in
Trump v. IRAP, SCOTUSBLOG (Jul. 12, 2017, 10:40 AM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2017/07/symposium-understanding-supreme-courtsequitable-ruling-trump-v-irap/ [https://perma.cc/7AMD-2N3G].

4.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2423.

5.

Id. at 2406.

6.

Id. at 2423.

7.

Id.

8.

See id. at 2408 (emphasizing the purely statutory and legal discretion of
the President’s authority).

9.

See id. at 2416-18 (discussing the potential animus arguments based on
President Trump’s statements on Muslims that were not considered by
the Supreme Court who instead looked at the neutral effect/purpose of
the Proclamation).
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action seeking a preliminary injunction.” 10 They are correct. Even if
no further evidence is added to the record, it is entirely foreseeable
that the district courts could rule against President Trump once
again. But the record is not sealed. Feldman adds that “the plaintiffs
could seek discovery to uncover new evidence of Trump’s thinking,
including, potentially, drafts of the executive order or memos about
it.” 11
Without question, the plaintiffs will seek discovery. They always
do. And the district courts very well may oblige such requests.
Following the lead of Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent, the district
courts could probe whether, in fact, exemptions are being granted
under the terms of the proclamation. 12 If the government wants to
avoid another trip to the Supreme Court, it should implement the
waiver policies in a liberal fashion.
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurring opinion, however, erects
important guardrails for allowing discovery beyond official records,
such as waiver requests. 13 First, Justice Kennedy questions “[w]hether
judicial proceedings may properly continue in this case, in light of the
substantial deference that is and must be accorded to the Executive
in the conduct of foreign affairs, and in light of today’s decision, is a
matter to be addressed in the first instance on remand.” 14 It is not a
given that any further proceedings would be “proper,” given the
Court’s definitive ruling, albeit on a threshold question about the
preliminary injunction. Specifically, Justice Kennedy writes that this
may be a case wherein the president has “discretion free from judicial
scrutiny.” 15 Second, Justice Kennedy explains that “even if further
proceedings are permitted, it would be necessary to determine that
any discovery and other preliminary matters would not themselves
intrude on the foreign affairs power of the Executive.” 16 Again, he
reiterates the deference due to the executive with respect to discovery
matters.
10.

Noah Feldman, Take Trump’s Travel Ban Back to Court, BLOOMBERG
OPINION
(June
29,
2018,
12:26
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-29/take-trump-stravel-ban-back-to-court [https://perma.cc/F2CM-FZHV].

11.

Id.

12.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2340 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“On the
other hand, if the Government is not applying the system of exemptions
and waivers that the Proclamation contains, then its argument for the
Proclamation’s lawfulness becomes significantly weaker.”).

13.

Id. at 2423-24 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

14.

Id. at 2424 (emphasis added).

15.

Id.

16.

Id.
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Indeed, this admonition sheds light on the Supreme Court’s
unsigned order from December in In Re United States. 17 In this case,
Judge William Alsup of the Northern District of California ordered
the government to produce internal documents about its decision to
terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
policy. 18 The Supreme Court, however, issued a writ of mandamus,
blocking the discovery request by a vote of 5 to 4. 19 In dissent,
Justice Breyer contended that “the Government’s arguments do not
come close to carrying the heavy burden that the Government bears
in seeking such extraordinary relief.” 20 Based on Justice Kennedy’s
concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, the soon-to-be retired jurist
likely agreed that the “heavy burden” was satisfied because of the risk
of intruding onto the executive’s powers. 21 Additionally, DACA—
unlike the travel ban—does not implicate “the foreign affairs power of
the Executive.” 22 Yet, a majority of the court still intervened at an
early juncture to halt intrusive discovery. 23
In light of Kennedy’s concurrence and the order in the DACA
case, I do not share Feldman and Fiss’s optimism as to the prospects
of discovery for the plaintiffs here, beyond the production of official
documents concerning the waiver process. The court—with or without
Kennedy—will not lightly entertain intrusive discovery orders. And if
no meaningful evidence is added to the record, it is difficult to see
how the district courts could find the proclamation unlawful on
remand.

II. How should the lower courts treat “this
President,” as opposed to “the President”?
On the eve of oral arguments, reporter Robert Barnes aptly
summarized Trump v. Hawaii in a pithy headline for the Washington
Post: “In travel ban case, Supreme Court considers ‘the president’ vs.
‘this president.’” 24 The Court chose the former. 25 “[W]e must consider
17.

In re United States, 138 S. Ct. 371 (2017) (mem).

18.

Regents of U. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. C 17-05211
WHA, 2017 WL 4642324, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 2017).

19.

In re United States, 138 S. Ct. at 371.

20.

Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).

21.

See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the need to not subject government actions to judicial
scrutiny in certain instances and that executive discretion may also fall
outside judicial scrutiny in some instances).

22.

Id.

23.

In re United States, 138 S.Ct. at 371.

24.

Robert Barnes, In Travel Ban Case, Supreme Court Considers ‘the
president’ vs. ‘this president’, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2018),
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not only the statements of a particular President,” Chief Justice
Roberts explained, “but also the authority of the Presidency itself.” 26
Specifically, the court concluded that “[t]he entry suspension is an act
that is well within executive authority and could have been taken by
any other President—the only question is evaluating the actions of
this particular President in promulgating an otherwise valid
Proclamation.” 27
Justice Kennedy made this point explicitly in his concurring
opinion. 28 He referenced “the substantial deference that is and must
be accorded to the Executive in the conduct of foreign affairs.” 29 He
added that “an official”—in this case, the president—”may have
broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny.” 30
At a minimum, Trump v. Hawaii—coupled with the arrival of a
new justice—should further lower the temperature of the judiciary
toward President Trump. A ruling against the president, however,
would have sent the opposite signal to an emboldened lower-court
judiciary. Still, the lower courts will no doubt take notice of the fact
that the Supreme Court considered extrinsic evidence, including preinauguration campaign-trail statements. 31 Although that evidence did
not tip the balance in this case, under the deferential standard of
review the court applied, such evidence may yield a different result in
cases involving domestic affairs—such as the DACA litigation—with
more stringent scrutiny.

III. How does the Constitution apply to aliens who
are not seeking entry into the United States but have
already crossed the border?
Does Trump v. Hawaii inform other immigration-related
litigation, such as cases concerning the rescission of DACA, the rights
of asylum seekers and family-separation policies? The short answer is
no, not directly. The level of scrutiny in Trump v. Hawaii was
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/in-travel-bancase-supreme-court-considers-the-president-vs-thispresident/2018/04/22/f33f1edc-44cb-11e8-856926fda6b404c7_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.dc133314069d
[https://perma.cc/GUK3-4ETX].
25.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2418.

26.

Id.

27.

Id. at 2423.

28.

Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

29.

Id.

30.

Id.

31.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2417-18.
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extremely deferential, but it was employed in a limited context. Chief
Justice Roberts explained that the “exclusion of foreign nationals is a
‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s
political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” 32 The
key word in that sentence is “exclusion.” The pivotal question, then,
is how does Hawaii extend to other pending cases that do not involve
“exclusion?”
The federal government’s power over immigration is often
described as “plenary.” 33 However, this authority applies differently
based on an alien’s connection to the United States. Landon v.
Plasencia recognized that “once an alien gains admission to our
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent
residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.” 34 Likewise,
under the rule in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, “aliens receive
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of
the United States and developed substantial connections with this
country.” 35 Congress’s authority in this sphere implicates four
different classes: (1) aliens within the border, (2) aliens who recently
crossed the border into the United States, (3), aliens outside the
United States who are not seeking entry, and (4) aliens seeking entry
into the United States. Trump v. Hawaii directly concerns the final
category, but implicates all four.
The first category considers the constitutional rights of aliens who
are within the United States, yet lack lawful presence. Specifically, do
noncitizens receive the full panoply of constitutional rights? The
answer is complicated. First, aliens are generally afforded the same
criminal procedure protections in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 36
Second, aliens are afforded reduced substantive rights. 37 For example,
32.

Id. at 2418 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)).

33.

Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255-57 (1984).

34.

459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769
(1950)).

35.

494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990).

36.

Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“Applying this
reasoning to the fifth and sixth amendments, it must be concluded that
all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the
protection guarantied [sic] by those amendments, and that even aliens
shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.”).

37.

See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976) (“The fact that all
persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by the Due Process
Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled
to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship…. For a host of constitutional
and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate
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aliens may have a right to public education, 38 but cannot make
contributions or independent expenditures for political campaigns,39
and are subject to a categorical ban on firearm ownership. 40 Third,
the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause also
vary for aliens within the United States. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the
Supreme Court recognized that “once an alien enters the country, the
legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all
‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” 41 Yet
that holding merely raises the question of what process is due.
Zadvydas acknowledged “that the Due Process Clause protects an
alien subject to a final order of deportation . . . though the nature of
that protection may vary depending upon status and circumstance.” 42
The courts still grapple with what sort of procedural protections are
required for aliens within the United States. 43
The second category implicates aliens who recently crossed the
border into the United States and lack lawful presence. In some cases,
aliens who recently (an ill-defined term) entered the United States
may be treated as if they had never entered in the first place. 44 For
example, the Third Circuit recently recognized that aliens who are
“apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering the United
States . . . cannot invoke the Constitution, including the Suspension
Clause,” because they were treated as if they were “alien[s] seeking
distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and
benefits for one class not accorded to the other…”).
38.

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (“In sum, education has a
fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot
ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select
groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon which
our social order rests.”).

39.

See Bluman v. FEC, 800 F.Supp.2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011)
(Kavanaugh, J.). Cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945)
(“Freedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this
country.”).

40.

United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d. 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2015).

41.

533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

42.

Id. at 693-94 (emphasis added).

43.

See Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney Gen. United States, 893 F.3d 153, 173
(3d Cir. 2018) (holding that aliens with the requisite connection to the
United States “enjoy at least ‘minimum due process rights…’”).

44.

See Landon, 459 U.S. at 38 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (finding that INS may proceed in exclusion hearing
so long as it satisfies Due Process clause); Castro v. United States Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir. 2016); Osorio-Martinez,
893 F.3d at 177.
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initial admission to the United States.” 45 Such recent entries may be
afforded certain statutory protections—such as asylum laws 46—but,
under this rule, cannot avail themselves of substantive and procedural
constitutional protections. 47 There is also an open question of whether
the federal government could expand “expedited removal” procedures
into the interior of the United States—currently, regulations limit
such removals to areas within 100 miles of the border. 48
The third category concerns something of a legal purgatory: what
rights are due to aliens outside the United States who are not seeking
entry. 49 These cases arise under tragic circumstances. Consider
Hernandez v. Mesa, where a border patrol agent fired two bullets
across the border, killing a Mexican national. 50 Here, the alien did not
attempt to enter the United States, but was unlawfully seized by a
federal agent. 51 In 2017, the Supreme Court declined to answer
whether damages were available under the Bivens doctrine. 52 Instead,
it remanded the case back to the 5th Circuit, with instructions to
reconsider Hernandez in light of Ziglar v. Abassi. 53 On remand, the en
banc Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that a Bivens claim can be
stated based on application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
“foreign citizens on foreign soil.” 54 Hernandez has been appealed to

45.

Castro v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d at 445-46,
cert. denied sub nom. Castro v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 137 S.Ct. 1581
(2017).

46.

8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2009).

47.

See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94 (citing multiple cases wherein
deportation of aliens already within the United States must survive Due
Process challenge).

48.

CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45314, EXPEDITED REMOVAL
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 2 (2018).

49.

Though within Cuba’s territorial sovereignty, the United States had
complete practical control over the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo
Bay. Therefore, the framework in Boumediene v. Bush is not relevant to
this inquiry. See 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“The detainees, moreover,
are held in a territory that, while technically not part of the United
States, is under the complete and total control of our Government.”).

50.

137 S.Ct. 2003 (2017).

51.

Id. at 2005.

52.

Id. at 2007; The Bivens doctrine provides that “damages may be
obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth
Amendment by federal officials.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395 (1971).

53.

Hernandez, 137 S.Ct. at 2006-08.

54.

Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 816-17 (5th Cir. 2018).
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the Supreme Court a second time. 55 In August 2018, the Ninth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion: a Mexican national in Mexico “had a
Fourth Amendment right to be free from the unreasonable use of such
deadly force” that is initiated by a federal agent “on American soil
subject to American law.” 56 The Supreme Court will likely have to
resolve this circuit split.
The fourth category implicates the holding of Trump v. Hawaii:
how the Constitution applies to aliens seeking entry into the United
States. Landon v. Pasencia stated the general rule: “[A]n alien seeking
initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no
constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit
or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.” 57 Yet, even this rule has
limits. Aliens seeking entry to the United State do not reside in a
constitutional desert. In Trump v. Hawaii, Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged that an American “person’s interest in being united
with his relatives [outside the United States] is sufficiently concrete
and particularized to form the basis of an Article III injury in fact.”58
In other words, the rights of Americans to be reunited with their
family imposes judicial scrutiny on the power to exclude. But here,
the Court does not apply its domestic establishment clause 59 and
substantive due process precedents. 60 Instead, in Hawaii, the Court
applied the most deferential strain of rational basis review. 61 In other
words, for “matters of entry and national security,” 62 the Court’s
“Establishment Clause precedents concerning laws and policies
applied domestically” are simply inapplicable to the context of a
foreign exclusion order. 63 Trump v. Hawaii, far from a comprehensive
explication of presidential power at the border, leaves these issues
unresolved.
55.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hernandez v. Mesa 885 F.3d 811 (2018)
(No. 17-_).

56.

Rodriguez v. Swartz, 829 F.3d 719, 730-31 (9th Cir. 2018).

57.

Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 (1982) (emphasis added).

58.

138 S.Ct. 2392, 2401 (2018).

59.

See Josh Blackman, The Domestic Establishment Clause, 23 ROGER
WILLIAMS L. REV. 345 (2018) (discussing domestic establishment clause).

60.

Cf. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (“Our
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in
this Nation’s history and tradition.”).

61.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2402.; see also Josh Blackman, The
Travel Bans, 2017-18 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 29, 41-43 (2018) (discussing
how national security concern resulted in a different standard of review).

62.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2420 (emphasis added).

63.

Id. at 2417 (emphasis added).
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IV. What is the scope of the president’s Article II
powers to exclude aliens?
The Hawaii court found that the “Proclamation is squarely within
the scope of Presidential authority.” 64 Therefore, the majority did not
need to address the scope of the president’s Article II powers to
exclude aliens. Had the court found that Congress did not delegate
this authority to the president, or that we were in Youngstown’s
“zone of twilight,” it would have had to answer this question.65
Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion, however, addressed
this question directly. He cited United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy (1950) for the proposition that “the President
has inherent authority to exclude aliens from the country.” 66
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will have to address the scope of
the president’s inherent powers to exclude aliens. And that analysis
will turn on the vitality of Knauff. This case addressed the interaction
between the president’s inherent authority over entry and Congress’s
rules concerning naturalization. 67 Knauff was a German national
married to an American citizen who was stationed in Frankfurt. 68 She
attempted to enter the United States, but was “detained at Ellis
Island.” 69 (An alien has not actually entered the United States until
clearing the checkpoint). 70 Without a hearing, an immigration official
determined “her admission would be prejudicial to the interests of the
United States,” and the Attorney General “entered a final order of
exclusion.” 71 The Southern District of New York dismissed Knauff’s
habeas corpus writ and the Second Circuit affirmed. 72

64.

Id. at 2415.

65.

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either
a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain.”).

66.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2424 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis
in original) (citing 338 U.S. 537, 542–43 (1950)).

67.

Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.

68.

Id. at 539.

69.

Id.

70.

See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1996) (any alien who attempts to enter
at any other place besides that designated by immigration officers is
subject to penalties).

71.

Knauff, 338 U.S. at 539-40.

72.

Id. at 540.

148

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Five Unanswered Questions

Through a 1941 law, Congress gave the president the power to
issue a proclamation, which would have the effect of rendering
“unlawful” the “entry into the United States” of certain aliens when
“the President shall find that the interests of the United States
require that restrictions.” 73 In other words, Congress permitted the
president to effectively amend the statutory grounds for
inadmissibility. President Roosevelt issued such a proclamation, which
ordered that “no alien should be permitted to enter the United States
if it were found that such entry would be prejudicial to the interest of
the United States.” 74 (This open-ended language is very similar to 8
U.S.C. 1182(f), which would be enacted a decade later.)
Pursuant to this proclamation, the Attorney General promulgated
the regulations that denied Knauff’s entry into the United States. 75
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Knauff argued that the “1941 Act
and the regulations thereunder are void to the extent that they
contain unconstitutional delegations of legislative power.” 76 The Court
rejected this argument. 77 The majority explained that the power at
issue in the 1941 act was not solely a legislative power; it was an
inherent executive power. 78 “The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental
act of sovereignty,” Justice Sherman Minton stated. 79 “The right to
do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.” 80 Thus,
there cannot be a violation of the non-delegation doctrine, because
Congress is not delegating legislative power at all. The Court
supported this argument with a citation to United States v. CurtissWright, which also rejected a non-delegation doctrine challenge
because the president was exercising his exclusive powers concerning
foreign affairs. 81
What was the 1941 act doing then, if not delegating legislative
power? “When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the
admissibility of aliens,” the Court explained, “it is not dealing alone
with a legislative power.” 82 Rather, “[i]t is implementing an inherent

73.

Id. at 540 n.1.

74.

Id. at 540-1.

75.

Id. at 541-542.

76.

Id. at 542.

77.

Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.

78.

Id.

79.

Id.

80.

Id.

81.

Id. (citing 299 U.S. 304 (1936)).

82.

Id.
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executive power.” 83 In the normal course, the Court noted, “Congress
supplies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United
States.” 84 However, “because the power of exclusion of aliens is also
inherent in the executive department of the sovereign, Congress may
in broad terms authorize the executive to exercise the power.” 85
Critically, the threshold decision to exclude—unlike the
subsequent decision to deport—is subject to only the slightest form of
review: “Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of persons
who have gained entry into the United States, it is not within the
province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to review
the determination of the political branch of the Government to
exclude a given alien.” 86 (This conclusion sounds in the doctrine of
consular nonreviewability.) 87 Though decided two years before
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Knauff’s analysis embodies
the characteristics of Justice Jackson’s first tier—because the
President is acting with a combination of his own inherent powers,
combined with the co-extensive powers delegated from Congress,
judicial scrutiny is at a minimum. 88
There are two possible reasons to hesitate before relying
on Knauff. First, there was only a four-member majority. 89 Justices
William O. Douglas and Tom Clark recused; 90 Justices Felix
Frankfurter, Hugo Black, and Robert Jackson dissented. 91 Majority
decisions that only garner four votes do not have the same weight as
a five-member majority. 92 Yet, the Court has cited Knauff favorably
over the decades, without any caveats—including the majority
opinion in Trump v. Hawaii. 93 Second, Justice Jackson—whose
83.

Knauff, 338 U.S. at 542.

84.

Id. at 543.

85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

Donald S. Dobkin, Challenging the Doctrine of Consular
Nonreviewability in Immigration Cases, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 113, 114
(2010).

88.

See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“A seizure
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would be
supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily
upon any who might attack it.”).

89.

Knauff, 338 U.S. at 537.

90.

Id. at 547.

91.

Id. at 550.

92.

See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on
Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2317-8 (1999) (describing a
four-member majority as “fractured support”).

150

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 51 (2019)
Five Unanswered Questions

wisdom we all turn to when considering the separation of powers—
dissented. 94 Indeed, his Knauff dissent did not even countenance that
such an inherent power exists. 95 This silence presaged his derision of
the
“vagueness
and
generality”
of
“inherent”
powers
in Youngstown two years later. 96
Eventually, the Court will have to address the scope of the
President’s Article II powers to exclude.

V. What is the permissible scope of a nationwide
injunction?
Over the past five years, the most powerful litigation tactic to
challenge executive actions has been the so-called nationwide
injunction. 97 Litigants need only shop for a favorable forum, persuade
a single district-court judge that they are likely to succeed on the
merits, and hope that a higher court does not stay the order. 98 Once
the injunction is issued, the executive branch ensures that all of its
officers around the globe cease enforcing the challenged policy against
everyone—not just those plaintiffs who brought the suit. 99 There has
been a robust debate about whether district courts have the power to
issue national or universal injunctions. 100 Justice Neil Gorsuch
euphemistically labelled them, “cosmic injunctions.” 101 Though
attorneys general past and present have protested such orders, they
have nevertheless complied. 102
93.

Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2407.

94.

Knauff, 338 U.S. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting).

95.

Id. at 551-552.

96.

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 647 (Jackson, J., concurring).

97.

See Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095
(2017) (discussing the widespread use and emergence of nationwide
injunctions within recent years).

98.

Id. at 2125.

99.

Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (2017).

the

National

100. See id. at 424 (“federal courts should issue injunctions that control a
federal defendant’s conduct only with respect to the plaintiff.”); Howard
Wasserman, Universal, Not Nationwide, and Never Appropriate: On the
Scope of Injunctions in Constitutional Litigation, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. (2018) (“…broad injunctions are problematic…”).
101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 73:8-10, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct.
2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
102. See Jethro Mullen and Jeremy Diamond, Obama Vows to Abide By
Immigration Court Order, CNN (Feb. 17, 2015, 5:04 PM ET),
https://www.cnn.com/2015/02/17/politics/texas-obama-immigrationinjunction/index.html
[https://perma.cc/C6BS-5RLK]
(Attorney
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Because the Supreme Court found that the travel ban was lawful
in its entirety, it did not have occasion to address the validity of
nationwide injunctions. 103 Justice Thomas thoroughly addressed that
issue in his solo concurring opinion:
“I am skeptical that district courts have the authority to enter
universal injunctions. These injunctions did not emerge until a
century and a half after the founding. And they appear to be
inconsistent with longstanding limits on equitable relief and the
power of Article III courts. If their popularity continues, this
Court must address their legality.” 104

The lower courts have already taken notice. Earlier this year, a
district court found that the attorney general could not deny Chicago
certain federal funding because of the city’s “sanctuary” policies.105
Rather than limiting its relief to Chicago, the court entered a
nationwide injunction. 106 A panel of the Seventh Circuit unanimously
affirmed the ruling, but split 2-1 on the validity of the nationwide
injunction. 107 The attorney general asked the en banc Seventh Circuit
to limit the relief to the city of Chicago. 108 The en banc court granted
review but postponed ruling on whether the nationwide injunction
should be stayed until the Supreme Court’s resolution of Trump v.
Hawaii. 109 The U.S. Solicitor General sought an application for a
stay from the Supreme Court. 110 Hours after Hawaii was decided,
the en banc Seventh Circuit put the nationwide injunction on hold. 111
General Holder described nationwide injunction halting DAPA as “ a
decision by one federal district court judge.”); see also Jeff Sessions,
U.S. Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the Federalist
Society’s Student Symposium (Mar. 10, 2018), available at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-deliversremarks-federalist-society-s-student-symposium
[https://perma.cc
/P6SE-UUP4 ] (“But the Department of Justice—under Democratic and
Republican administrations alike—has been consistent over these past
several decades that nationwide injunctions gravely threaten the rule of
law.”).
103. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. at 2423.
104. Id. at 2425 (Thomas, J., concurring).
105. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 264 F.Supp.3d 933, 940 (N.D. Il. 2017).
106. Id. at 951.
107. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2018).
108. Id. at 277.
109. City of Chicago v. Sessions, 2018 WL 4268814 (Aug. 10, 2018)
110. Application for Partial Stay, Sessions III v. City of Chicago, No.
17A1379 (June 18, 2018).
111. Order from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, City of Chicago v.
Sessions III, No. 172991 (7th Cir. June 26, 2018).
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So far, the judiciary has been able to avoid the problem of dueling
cosmic injunctions where one court orders the government to perform
a certain action and another court orders the government to cease
performing that action. Assuming one district court has the power to
issue a cosmic injunction, do two district courts have the power to
issue conflicting cosmic injunctions? This question can be framed in
one of two ways. Broadly, should the fact that Court #1 found that it
would be unconstitutional to halt a policy, prevent Court #2 from
finding that policy itself is constitutional? Most observers would
answer of course not: A district court does not bind another district
court, even one in the same circuit. 112 The narrower question is much
tougher: Should the fact that Court #1 ordered the government to
continue implementing a policy prevent Court #2 from ordering the
government to halt the policy altogether? If the answer to the first
hypothetical is of course not, what principle of federal jurisprudence
would compel a different answer to the second hypothetical? The
answer lies in the distinction between a precedent and a judgment. 113
The declarations in the first hypothetical do not give rise to the
conflict; rather, only the ensuing injunctions trigger the conflict.
Perhaps Court #2 seeks to avoid a conflict. As a result, it decides not
to issue the dueling injunction. Instead, it could issue a mere
declaration, or it could issue a declaration with a stayed injunction.
Alternatively, if Court #2 decides to issue a dueling injunction, then
Court #1 could subsequently modify its initial injunction. It is even
conceivable that Court #2 could ask the plaintiffs to intervene in
Court #1, and challenge the scope of that injunction.
What, then, should be the rule to decide which injunction
controls, in the hypothetical situation where a higher court does not
intervene? Perhaps the first-in-time injunction ought to prevail. But
that regime would perversely reward whichever litigant wins the race
to the courthouse, and privilege the judge who rules in the quickest—
and most cursory—fashion. Why should one judgment estop all other
courts from ruling? Perhaps a different rule should be that injunction
that favors the status quo should be preferred over injunctions that
disturb the status quo. Yet, the familiar four-factor test for
preliminary relief asks courts to consider not only whether the status
quo should be maintained, but whether the issuance would likely yield

112. Barbara Bintliff, Mandatory v. Persuasive Cases, THOMPSON REUTERS
(2001),
https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/perspec/2001winter/winter-2001-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/XW8S-KVUG].
113. See Josh Blackman & Howard M. Wasserman, The Process of Marriage
Equality, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243 (2016) (discussing the
implications and interrelations of judgments and precedent).
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“irreparable harm” or harm the “public interest.” 114 A status-quo
based rule would not provide much guidance. Ultimately, the conflict
boils down into a game of jurisprudential chicken: which judge decides
to back away from issuing a dueling cosmic injunction. Prudential
concerns may prevent one judge from stepping on the toes of another
judge, but these are not constitutional considerations. Given the
insulation and autonomy afforded by life tenure, it is entirely possible
that neither side would blink.
There is not necessarily anything wrong with that independence.
One district court judge is not supreme over another. It is true that
in Cooper v. Aaron, the Supreme Court arrogated for itself the power
of judicial supremacy, such that it can determine, with finality, the
meaning of the “supreme Law of the land.” 115 But the district courts
lack any pretense to this purported supremacy. Call it
instead judicial inferiority: the mere fact that dueling cosmic
injunctions can even exist highlights the fact that this sort of
stalemate is constitutionally proper. Each judge takes the same oath
to the Constitution, and has equal authority to rule on the
constitutionality of an executive action—regardless of whether he or
she is the first or last to do so, and regardless of whether his or her
order disrupts or maintains the status quo. Court #1 should not
control the declarations of Court #2. Likewise, Court #1 should not
control the injunctions of Court #2.
Eventually, the Supreme Court will address the scope of
nationwide injunctions in the sanctuary city, or perhaps the DACA
litigation.

114. Anna Majestro, Preparing for and Obtaining Preliminary Injunctive
Relief,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION
(June
4,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org
/groups/litigation/committees/womanadvocate/practice/2018/preliminary-injuction-relief/
[https://perma.cc/2K6E-9W8X].
115. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24 (1958).

154

